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The recent popularity of legal pluralism has now reached the area of European private
law. In this paper I scrutinize the concepts of legal pluralism used by three of its most
prominent proponents: Pierre Legrand, Jan Smits, and Thomas Wilhelmsson. I do not
offer fully-fledged criticism of their theories (each of which are among the most
fascinating and helpful in the European private law debate) but only address their use of
ideas of legal pluralism, and the relation of these ideas with the legal pluralism debate.
My analysis shows not only that these three use sharply different concepts of legal
pluralism, but also, that none of these three concepts is in accordance with traditional
definitions of pluralism. Further, it turns out that several points of criticism can be raised
against their theories that stem from the legal pluralism debate. I do not, here, take the
second step of determining whether an actual concept of European private law pluralism
can be established – and whether such a concept can withstand the criticism that has been
voiced against the idea of legal pluralism.
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I. Introduction
A significant part of the debates over European private law concerns the relations
between the member state level and the European level. The substance of this
debate has remained remarkably constant in since it arose some thirty years ago,
despite the events that have taken place during that period: the growth of actual EU
legislation in European private law; the formulation of a social alternative to the
perceived market liberal private law ideal dominating in EU law, the simultaneous
broadening and deepening of European integration, etc. Still, the basic question
remains this: how much private law should be made (and unified) on a European
level, how much law should remain within the member states, and how should the
relations between European and domestic level be organized?
If the debates deal with the same substance, the terminology, however, has changed.
For a long time, national European law was defended as an achievement of national
identity and democratic legitimacy—the cultural value of national private law was a
relevant factor, but it was usually defended as a subset of national law.1 Today, the
European Union has significantly improved its democratic legitimacy and moved its
own identity beyond that of a purely economic union. It is perhaps in response to
these changes that defenders of national private law are now, more and more,
invoking a new idea – that of legal pluralism.2 And indeed, some Europeanists are
accepting the terminology and begin to argue against such legal pluralism.3
But legal pluralism is no invention by private lawyers—both the concept and the
theory have spurred long discussions in legal anthropology, legal sociology, and
legal theory. Although proponents of a European legal pluralism sometimes invoke
these discussions, they tend to gloss over the precise way in which the concept is
defined and defended in these debates, and they tend to ignore the backlash that has
emerged against the concept in these disciplines. This is unfortunate. After all, the
discussion provides rich experiences, both theoretical and empirical, on the
interactions between legal orders. European private law could perhaps benefit from

See R Michaels, ‘Code vs Code: Nationalist and Internationalist Images of the Code
civil in the French Resistance to a European Codification’ (2012) 8 European Review
of Contract Law ___ .
2 In addition to the texts by Legrand, Smits and Wilhelmsson discussed below, see
e.g. K Purnhagen, ‘Principles of European Private or Civil Law? – A Reminder of the
Symbiotic Relationship between the ECJ and the CFR in a Pluralistic European
Private Law’ European Law Journal (forthcoming); see already R Schulze,
‘Pluralismus der Rechte in Europa’ in HD Assmann et al (eds), Unterschiedliche
Rechtskulturen—Konvergenz des Rechtsdenkens (Nomos, 2001).
3 Eg B Akkermans, ‘L’Europe, c’est nous’ and the way forward…,’ Mastricht European
Private Law Blog at www.mepli.blogspot.com/2011/01/leurope‐cest‐nous‐and‐
way‐forward.html (January 25, 2011).
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taking these debates into account; at least they may help throw new lights on
existing debates.
In this paper I want to take a first, critical, step towards such an account. I want to
scrutinize the concepts of legal pluralism used by three of its most prominent
proponents: Pierre Legrand, Jan Smits, and Thomas Wilhelmsson. I do not offer
fully‐fledged criticism of their theories (each of which are among the most
fascinating and helpful in the European private law debate) but only address their
use of ideas of legal pluralism, and the relation of these ideas with the legal
pluralism debate. My analysis shows not only that these three use sharply different
concepts of legal pluralism, but also, that none of these three concepts is in
accordance with traditional definitions of pluralism. Further, it turns out that
several points of criticism can be raised against their theories that stem from the
legal pluralism debate. I do not, here, take the second step of determining whether
an actual concept of European private law pluralism can be established – and
whether such a concept can withstand the criticism that has been voiced against the
idea of legal pluralism.

II. Legal Pluralism and Private Law
The traditional concept of legal pluralism, developed in legal anthropology and
sociology to analyze overlapping normative orders within societies, became popular
in the 1970s and 1980s, though the phenomenon is much older. 4 Although
definitions of legal pluralism diverge on details,5 there is a wide consensus that legal
pluralism describes a situation in which two or more laws (or legal systems) coexist
in (or are obeyed by) one social field (or a population or an individual).6 In this way,
legal pluralism is opposed to what is called state centralism—a perceived monopoly
of the state in making and administering law. The contribution of this concept to our
understanding of law is, therefore, twofold: First, it suggests that normative orders
not generated by the state can also be viewed as law. Second, as a consequence, it
requires us to deal with the existence of, and interaction among, more than one legal
order.

B Tamanaha, ‘Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global’
(2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 375; L Benton, ‘Historical Perspectives on Legal
Pluralism’ (2011) 3 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 57.
5 For discussion, see F von Benda‐Beckmann, ‘Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?’
(2002) 47 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 37; W Twining, ‘Normative
and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective’ (2010) 20 Duke Journal of International
and Comparative Law 473.
6 R Michaels, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ (2009) 5 Annual Review of Law and the Social
Sciences 243, 245.
4
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In theory, the first aspect – non‐state law – should be of specific interest to private
lawyers. After all ‘private’ law has always been about both: law made for and law
made by private parties.7 However, although some participants in the debates about
European private law do include the first aspect and address the existence and role
of non‐state law in European private law,8 the focus on the debate on European
private law pluralism is on the second aspect, that of plurality. This might suggest
that what authors mean when they say pluralism is merely plurality, and therefore,
debates on legal pluralism would not be helpful. I do not think this response is
successful. If indeed the European discourse addresses merely the existence of a
plurality of legal orders, without attention to their interaction, that discourse is
incomplete and can benefit from the legal pluralism debate.

a) ‘Weak’ or Juridical Legal Pluralism
The first generation of legal pluralism, at least in this trajectory, was developed,
especially by lawyers, in the colonial and postcolonial context.9 Colonies in Africa
and Asia lacked the order of law in European states; they displayed somewhat
unorganized laws that were deemed tribal, or customary law. Colonizing powers
imposed their own law, while carefully leaving some space for this customary law
that they found. Legal pluralism was then used as a tool to describe the ensuing
plurality of interacting legal systems, and as a theory of their interaction. This type
of legal pluralism is sometimes called ‘juridical pluralism’ because it was described
mainly by lawyers, and it was also managed by specifically legal means – direct or
indirect rule,10 hierarchical superiority rules, conflict‐of‐laws rules.11

R Michaels and N Jansen, ‘Private Law Beyond the State? Globalization,
Europeanization, Privatization’ (2006) 54 American Journal of Comparative Law 843.
Cf. F Möslein, Dispositives Recht (Mohr Siebeck, 2011).
8 See e.g. J Smits, Private Law 2.0: on the Role of Private Actors in a Post‐National
Society (Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law, 2011) 8‐9; ; Christian
Joerges, ‘A New Type of Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form in the Postnational
Constellation’ (2011) Transnational Legal Theory 153, 160. The most magisterial
analysis (though not exclusively focused on Europe) is G Calliess and P Zumbansen,
Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational Private Law (Hart,
2010).
9 MB Hooker, Legal Pluralism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975).
10 M Crowder, ‘Indirect Rule: French and British Style’ (1964) 34 Journal of the
International African Institute 197.
11 RD Kollewijn, ‘Conflicts of Western and Non‐Western Law’ (1951) 4 International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 307; K Lipstein, ‘Interpersonal conflict of laws’ in
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Mohr Siebeck/MartinusNijhoff
1985); U Uche, ‘Conflict of Laws in a Multi‐Ethnic Setting: Lessons From Anglophone
Africa’ (1991) 228 Recueil des Cours 273.
7

4

This concept of legal pluralism came under severe criticism.12 The main criticism
was that a situation in which the state is still viewed as superior to other legal
orders was no way to overcome state centralism.13 In some ways, it creates even an
enhanced state centralism, because now state law sets out to define, and
subordinate, even non‐state normative orders.14 It was, in other words, ‘weak’ legal
pluralism. Moreover, to subject non‐state legal orders to the recognition by the state
was considered oppressive: recognition should be a consequence of these orders’
existence and their legal character, not its prerequisite.15 The exclusively legal
perspective on legal pluralism was blamed for this situation; the exclusive focus on
order was considered repressive.

b) ‘Strong’ or Sociological Legal Pluralism
An alternative to this ‘weak’ or juridical legal pluralism was sought and found in
what is sometimes called ‘strong’ or sociological legal pluralism. This view takes
legal pluralism as a fact of sociological observation, which demonstrates that
individuals everywhere are governed by (or feel compelled by) a plurality of
different, sometimes conflicting norms, only some of which emanate in the state.16
The sociological perspective also rejects clear rules describing the relation between
the existing plural orders. Hierarchy is rejected, both on normative and on empirical
grounds: hierarchy is not desirable to give hierarchy to state law and thereby reduce
other laws to the status of subordination, but hierarchy is also not empirically true,
because the relation between the different normative orders is under constant
negotiation. Conflict of laws rules are also dismissed (in my view, a bit too hastily)17,
either because such rules deny legal pluralism altogether (by allocating a distinct
space to each of them) or because they provide an unduly technical and orderly way
to deal with the interactions between legal orders. Instead, the idea of ‘interlegality,’
introduced by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, has proven popular.
This ‘new’ legal pluralism was not necessarily confined to the colonial and
postcolonial context and has been made fruitful also for interactions between
official and unofficial rules in Western legal systems.
See especially, John Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1.
13 Griffiths, supra note 12 at 8.
14 See also R Michaels, ‘The Re‐State‐Ment of Non‐State Law’ (2005) 51 Wayne Law
Review 1209.
15 See also R Bolens et al, Legal Pluralism and the Politics of Inclusion: Recognition
and Contestation of Local Water Rights in the Andes, in B van Koppen et al (eds)
Community‐based Water Law and Water Resource Management Reform in Developing
Countries (CAB International, 2007) 96, 99‐101.
16 Griffiths, supra note 12 at 4 (‘Legal pluralism is a fact. Legal centralism is a myth,
an ideal, a claim, an illusion.’).
17 R Michaels, supra note 6, at 245 with references. See also now PS Berman, Global
Legal Pluralism (Cambridge University Press 2012).
12
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c) Critique of Legal Pluralism
In recent years, the idea of legal pluralism, whether weak or strong, juristic or
sociological, has come under severe criticism in legal sociology and anthropology.18
Notably (and importantly) the alternative proposed by the critics has not been legal
monism. Their point was not to deny the plurality of law, but rather the way in
which this plurality is conceptualized by proponents of legal pluralism.
Among the myriad of critical points, the following may be the most helpful for the
debate on legal pluralism in Europe. First, ideas of legal pluralism, willingly or not,
tend to prioritize, normatively, plurality over uniformity, without a clear
justification.19 In the same realm, they prefer the local over the global, or, put
differently, they tend to romanticize customary, non‐state legal orders, while at the
same time villifying the state. Second, studies of legal pluralism are often blind for
power relations, both within and between legal orders: 20 The emphasis on a
plurality of legal orders underestimates the tendency of some of those to be far
more powerful than others; the view of customary legal orders as ‘black boxes’
makes criticism of the content of customary law difficult to sustain. (This struggle
plays out also in the debate between multiculturalism and basic rights, and the
question whether the autonomy of groups should be recognized even if these
groups themselves discriminate internally against their members.) Third, legal
pluralism tends to essentialize legal orders—it assigns objective reality to them,
whereas in reality such orders remain in constant flux, may change over time,
develop both internally and in their relationship with other orders.21 Fourth, and
relatedly, the idea of legal pluralism requires the possibility to distinguish between
legal relations within a legal order and relations between legal orders; it must
therefore assume relatively strong boundaries between legal orders, and a relatively
high degree of consistency within legal orders.22 Fifth, legal pluralism, in its
emphasis on legal orders as constraints, underestimates human agency.23

For debate of much of this criticism by a proponent of legal pluralism see Benda‐
Beckmann, supra note 5. For references for the following critique, see Michaels,
supra note 6.
19 M Sharafi, ‘Justice in Many Rooms Since Galanter: De‐Romanticizing Legal
Pluralism Through the Cultural Defense’ (2008)71 Law & Contemporart Problems
139.
18

G Barzilai, ‘Beyond Relativism: Where is Political Power in Legal Pluralism?’ (2008) 9
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 395.
21 JF Weiner, ‘Eliciting customary law’ (2006) Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 15.
22 S Wastell, ‘Presuming Scale, Making Diversity – On the Mischiefs of Measurement and the
Global: Local Metonym in Theories of Law and Culture’ (2001) 21 Critique of Anthropology
185.
23 Jeremy Webber, ‘Legal Pluralism and Human Agency’ (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall Law Journal
20
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III. A Communitarian Pluralism – Pierre Legrand
My first example comes from Pierre Legrand, who has long advocated that the
plurality of European legal systems is both desirable and insurmountable. Legrand
is responsible for a university program on ‘globalization and legal pluralism’ at the
Sorbonne, and frequently invokes ideas of legal pluralism for his opposition to
convergence and unification of European private law.24 Here is an excerpt from his
criticism of the Draft Common Frame of Reference project:25
I need not even argue that legal pluralism is inherently good. It is enough for me to say
that legal traditions and the diversity of forms of life-in-the-law they embody remain the
expression of the human capacity for choice and self-creation and, as such, deserve to be
respected as incorporating a vital aspect of social existence which helps to define
selfhood. Legal communities and individuals within these communities deserve to be
given their historical due. They are entitled to deep-level recognition. Indeed, they can
demand recognition of their ontological identity but also of their positional identity; I
have in mind, for instance, the common law’s antirrhetic positioning vis-à̀ -vis the civil
law.

This is, clearly, a sociological (or cultural), not a juridical pluralism. And indeed, this
brief passage sounds attractive enough. Yet, closer analysis reveals a number of
problems and inconsistencies.

a) Pluralism and Choice
First, Legrand suggests that legal traditions must be recognized because they
express ‘the human capacity for choice and self‐creation;’ they incorporate ‘a vital
aspect of social existence which helps to define selfhood.’ Legal traditions are, in
other words, both the object of choice and its precondition. We, as individuals,
should be free to choose our own legal tradition – say, that of English law—and not
have some foreign tradition imposed on us—say, that of the civil law, or of a
European civil code. And, at the same time, if we are denied our legal tradition, we
are denied our own social existence and thereby the conditions necessary for
meaningful choice.
Legal traditions are thus object and precondition of choice at the same time. This is
not paradoxical, but it makes the role of choice certainly more complex than this
seemingly simple quote suggests. Thus, on the one hand, Legrand does not here
advocate the free choice of any legal tradition, that is, the idea of a law market,26

24

See already P Legrand, ‘Against a European Civil Code’ (1997) 60 Modern Law

Review 44, 53 (‘The promotion of a European Civil Code effectively represents an
attack on pluralism’).
25 P Legrand, ‘Antivonbar’ (2005) 1 Journal of Comparative Law 13, 36, internal
footnote omitted.
26 EA O’Hara and LE Ribstein, The Law Market (Oxford University Press, 2009).
7

where law becomes a mere product.27 He would view a law market as an undue
imposition of the logic of economics, competition, and commensuration, on legal
traditions.28 In his proposal, we are in fact allowed only to choose our own legal
tradition. Indeed, Legrand has elsewhere suggested that we are so bound by our
tradition that we cannot overcome it: a civil lawyer can never think like a common
lawyers; he can never become anything else than what he is.29 This type of selfhood
then, it seems, is the opposite of choice; it is a matter of fate. If this implies freedom,
then it is at best the Hegelian idea of freedom as the insight into necessity.30
On the other hand, Legrand is certainly correct that we make our choice not in a
vacuum but within the constraints and empowerments from our environment,
including our culture and our legal tradition. True choice and true definition of
selfhood are not possible without recognition of that environment, and that
environment is an important factor for our choices. Legrand sides here with
communitarian/post‐Hegelian critics of liberalism, who point out that the self is not
prior to its decisions.31
This preference for communitarianism is a possible position, although maybe not a
watertight one. Amartya Sen, for example, has, without addressing Legrand or
comparative law, suggested that our identities are a matter of our choice, not
necessity.32 Moreover, Sen’s idea of ‘substantial’ freedom is almost the opposite of
Legrand’s Hegelian insight into necessity: it is the maximization of real
opportunities, which may have to be brought about by a change of the governance
structure.
Legrand’s views on the relation between choice and environment may be defensible.
What seems odd, however, is his implicit assumption that that environment is
necessarily, and unchangeably, given by a national legal tradition. This assumption
is not implied by his communitarian allies—whereas Hegel, of course, indeed
viewed the state as the highest order, communitarians in his succession like Taylor
and Walzer have emphasized the importance of non‐state communities and orders,
and in fact their multiplicity. Arguably, our legal environment today, and the
Roberta Romano, ‘Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle’
(1985) 1 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 225; H Eidenmüller, ‘The
Transnational Law Market, Regulatory Competition, and Transnational
Corporations’ (2011) 18 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 707.
28 P Legrand, ‘Econocentrism’ (2009) 59 University of Toronto Law Journal 215.
29 P Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems are not Converging’ (1996) 45 International
& Comparative Law Quarterly 52, 78.
30 On the connection between Legrand’s ideas and Hegel, see J Q Whitman, ‘The Neo‐
Romantic Turn’ in P Legrand & R Munday (eds) Comparative Legal Studies:
Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 316.
31 See e.g., M Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Harvard University Press,
2d ed. 1998); Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity
(Harvard University Press, 1989); M Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Plurality
and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
32 A Sen, Reason Before Identity (Oxford University Press, 1999).
27
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conditions of our choices, are also already made up of a cacophony of norms and
laws, some of which are from foreign legal traditions or from supranational law or
from nonstate normative orders like religion. Legrand’s view, that we are influenced
only by one legal tradition, be it civil of common law, actually appears to suppress
such difference. This is no novelty: legal pluralism in this sense characterized both
the common law and the civil law since times immemorial.33 But although Legrand
acknowledges the existence of differences within legal traditions, he clearly views
them as secondary,34 and they play no role for his analysis.35

b) Just and Unjust Communities
Let me move to another point. Legrand suggests that ‘legal communities and
individuals within these communities deserve to be given their historical due.’ We
may wonder what ‘their historical due’ is exactly, but it seems to be something. But
in what sense is this not an is/ought cross‐over? Why does a legal tradition deserve
recognition merely because it exists?
This is a problem that permeates discussions in legal pluralism, too: cultures and
traditions are viewed as deserving protection merely because they exist. This
sounds attractive, but it is not at all obvious. The mafia culture is cruel; is it
nonetheless worthy of protection merely because it is a culture? It may be
paternalistic to try and eradicate cultures merely for the sake of unity, but is it not
similarly paternalistic to want to protect and defend cultures and traditions merely
for the sake of their existence?
The biggest problem, however, lies elsewhere: It is fine to recognize communities
and individuals, but what if there is a conflict between what legal communities are
due and what individuals within these communities are due? This is the issue brought
to the fore in Susan Moller Okin’s now famous powerful question whether
multiculturalism is bad for women, because the cultural groups that we recognize
may themselves be discriminatory.36 In such a case, arguably, we can either
recognize fully the community or the individual but not both, and it is not obvious

For the common law, see HW Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and
Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England (University of Toronto Press, 1985); L
Sheleff, The Future of Tradition: Customary Law, Common Law, and Legal Pluralism
(2000); GR Woodman, ‘The involvement of English common law with other laws’ in
C Eberhard and G Vernicos (eds) La quête anthropologique du droit: Autour de la
démarche d’Etienne Le Roy (Editions Karthala, 2006), 477. For the civil law, see B
Tamanaha, supra note 4, at 377‐81; J Tontti , European Legal Pluralism as a Rebirth
of Jus Commune, (2001) 24 Retfaerd Nord 40.
34 E.g. Legrand, supra note 29, at 63
35 Cf. Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and Method in Law (Ashgate 2003) 50 note 141.
36 S Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton University Press
1999).
33

9

which of them should take priority.37 The mere idea of (‘deep’) recognition, which
Legrand borrows from Michael Walzer, does not seem to help; it is precisely in
response to the emphasis on recognition (by Walzer and others) that Okin’s
challenge and the ensuing debate arose.
These questions are, at least prima facie, relevant also to private law. Private law
has traditionally been viewed as freedom‐enhancing, but there is little doubt that it
can also be constraining.38 Same‐sex couples who cannot get married under Irish
law are an obvious example. consumers who are barred from purchasing certain
products are another, but of course, so are consumers who are stuck, under
doctrines of freedom of contract, with destructive mortgage contracts. The
communitarian argument may still succeed if it can be shown that the best way to
improve the individual’s situation lies within the respective legal system—in other
words, although private law systems may be different, and differently unjust, they
each provide the best opportunities for improvement internally. This would be
plausible if indeed freedom and embeddedness within one’s legal tradition were
inseparably linked—the argument discussed in the previous section. Many
individuals, however, seem to disagree—they opt out of their own legal systems.
Christian Joerges has made a powerful counterproposal to Legrand’s suggestion that
recognition of the individual and her legal order are the same. In his view, one of the
most important functions of European law is that it enables the individual to require
her own government to justify its actions.39 Here, the alternative is not between
recognizing the legal order and recognizing the individual. Rather, the idea is for
European law to intervene in the relation between the individual and her society
and empower her, to some extent and under certain conditions, vis‐à‐vis the legal
order. Legrand would probably reject such types of intervention because of the
violence they commit against a legal culture that deserves protection, but he does
not tell us why injustice against a legal order must necessarily be more important
than injustice against an indivudal.

c) ‘Antirrhesis’
Finally, it is worth analyzing ‘the common law’s antirrhetic positioning vis‐à‐vis the
civil law.’40 Legrand borrows the idea of antirrhesis from Peter Goodrich, who in
turn finds it in theological rhetoric. Antirrhesis is, according to Henry Peacham, ‘a
This is a simplified discussion; for detail, see K Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise
Riles, ‘From Multiculturalism to Technique: Feminism, Culture and the Conflict of
Laws Style’ (2012) 64 Stanford Law Review 589, 596‐609.
38 The classical argument is RL Hale, ‘Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Non‐Coercive State’ (1923) 38 Political Science Quarterly 470,.
39 C Joerges, ‘On the Legitimacy of Europeanising Private Law: Considerations on a
Justice‐making Law for the EU Multilevel System”’ (2003) 7:3 Electronic Journal of
Comparative Law 7:3, http://www.ejcl.org/73/art73‐3.html;
40 Legrand has made this argument earlier; see P Legrand, ‘The same and the
different’ in P Legrand and R Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions
and Transitions (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 240, at 244‐5.
37
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form of speech by which the orator rejecteth the authority, opinion or sentence of
some person: for error or wickedness of it … this form of speech doth especially
belong to confutation and is most apt to repell errors and heresies and to reject evil
counsell and lewd perversions.41 What is at stake here, is, in other words, the violent
refutation of an argument. As such it appears to be, if anything, the very opposite of
the recognition that Legrand proclaims.
It seems questionable whether such antirrhesis really describes, in an objective
sense, the view the common law takes of the civil law. Goodrich himself does argue
this, but mainly in the context of debates in sixteenth century England: ‘the rule of
the parent civil law is a trauma for a common law which seeks its own identity
through separation, antirrhetic, and polemic.’42 This describes a particular point in
time—the fight of protestants against catholics (who represented the civil law). It is
not obvious why this historical precedent of antirrhesis must invariably still be valid
today—or why this particular view of the rhetorical element in the common law,
found in the common law, should be unavoidable for modern (or postmodern) legal
anslysis.43
For comparative law purposes, another thing is even more important. We should
recall that the violent refutation in question here was not directed against the civil
law as the external other, but first and foremost against the heretics within English
law.44 The problem was not, in other words, that the civil law was irremediable alien
to the common law but, rather, that it was threatening to take over English law from
within. Or, put differently, the fight between common law and civil law was a fight
within an English law that was itself pluralistic in nature. Legrand’s own frequent
point that the common law is incommensurable with the civil law is itself a
rhetorical move, a claim not for empirical truth but a position.
Whether, then, the common law is really antirrhetic vis‐à‐vis the civil law, is a
matter of viewpoint, perhaps also of empirics. What seems clear, however, is that
antirrhesis is a consequence not of incommensurability but, quite to the contrary, is
one (extreme) position taken in response to the threat of actual commensurability.
This means that this is only one possible position that legal traditions can take vis‐à‐
vis each other, and it is not even the one that Legrand himself seems to prefer. The
normative problem is that antirrhesis represents precisely the violence against the
other that Legrand otherwise deplores.
The trouble with Legrand’s theory, then, is twofold. On the one hand, he commits to
a number of ideas that are in accordance with legal pluralism but that have been
H Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (H. Jackson, 1593), sig. N iv b‐N v a; cited
after P Goodrich, ‘Antirrhesis. Polemical Structures of Common Law Thought’ in A
Sarat and TR Kearns (eds), The Rhetoric of Law (1995) 5, 59.
42 P Goodrich, Oedipus Lex: Psychoanalysis, History, Law (University of California
Press, 1995) 160.
43 Cf R Weisberg, ‘Response to Goodrich on the Antirrhetic’ (1992) 4 Cardozo Studies
in Law and Literature 237, 238.
44 Cf Goodrich 207.
41
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shown to be problematic. On the other hand, it is questionable whether his theory is
one of legal pluralism at all. If legal pluralism depicts ‘the coexistence of several
normative orders in the same social field’ then Legrand’s depiction is not legal
pluralism, because he denies, or at least downplays, the existence of the very social
field in question: for him, legal traditions exist in neatly distinct fields. This is quite a
powerful limitation of his theory, because it is the very interpenetration of legal
orders that creates the question. Moreover, although he sometimes denies this, 45
one underlying assumption seems to be of legal cultures that are conceived of as
unrealistically unchangeable.

IV.A Liberal Pluralism– Jan Smits
Such criticism may not be apt against Jan Smits’s recent development of legal
pluralism as a helpful approach for European private law.46 The plurality of laws
that Smits has in mind is not just, as in some of his earlier work, that of the member
state laws. Rather, Smits argues that the nation state can no longer be viewed as the
exclusive source of private law, nor can its democratic procedures be viewed as the
sole source of legitimacy for private law norms.47 A plurality of sources exists—
some national, some European, some non‐state—and the multiple sources overlap
(have, as he puts it, ‘an equal claim to validity’48) and stand in no clear hierarchical
relation that could establish priorities. As a consequence, it becomes questionable
whether private law is still ‘a system.’ Smits argues that such pluralism should
neither be eliminated—through uniformisation or through top‐down allocation by
means of private‐international‐law rules—nor managed on the basis of some
overarching policy, as in the Open Method of Coordination. Rather, plurality should
be encouraged. Borrowing from literature on legal pluralism, Smits argues that
people can feel a sense of belonging to several groups and being bound to their rules,
Legrand himself distances himself from claims for internal coherence of either the
civil or the common law tradition: P Legrand, supra note 40 at 244. His argument,
however, seems to rest on such an assumption.
46 J Smits, ‘Plurality of Sources in European Private Law, or: How to Live With Legal
Diversity?,’ in Brownsword et al. (eds), The Foundations of European Private Law
(Hart Publishing 2011) 323; J Smits, ‘ A Radical View of Legal Pluralism’ in this
volume ____.
47 On this point also J Smits, ‘European Private Law and Democracy—A
Misunderstood Relationship’ in M. Faure and F Stephen (eds), Essays in the Law and
Economics of Regulation in Honour of Anthony Ogus (Oxford Intersentia, 2008) 49.
48 J Smits, ‘The Complexity of Transnational Law: Coherence and Fragmentation of
Private Law’ (2010) 14:3 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, 10,
http://www.ejcl.org/143/abs143‐14.html. .
45
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so they should be able to choose the laws applicable to them. The consequence
would be the decline of private law as a coherent system and of equal treatment, but
these are not urgent problems once we conceive of law as a market.49
Note several ways in which Smits’ conception of legal pluralism is opposed to that of
Pierre Legrand. Other than Legrand, Smits proposes a juridical pluralism. However,
where Legrand, like juridical pluralists, speaks of several incompatible but
internally largely homogenous legal traditions (as expressed in national legal
systems), Smits, seemingly like sociological pluralists, emphasizes the hybridity of
the emerging law. Where Legrand essentially claims that individuals belong firmly
to one tradition only, Smits emphasizes their plural affiliations. As a consequence,
where choice for Legrand means the ability to make one’s tradition one’s own; for
Smits it means the possibility to switch between different traditions and their laws.

a) Legal Pluralism and Choice
This use of choice is an ingenious twist on traditional ideas of communities. In much
of the literature on legal pluralism, belonging to numerous communities is a matter
not of choice but of necessity: a London‐born Muslim may feel both as an
Englishman and as a Muslim, but neither identity is a matter of choice for him, and
the ensuing conflict between English and Islamic rules may feel more like a tragic
choice50 than like the opportunity that Smits paints. Arguably, then, Smits’ pluralism
is not in accordance with traditional legal pluralism, but rather its opposite – Smits
now calls his a ‘radical view of legal pluralism’51. The trader in the law market is the
opposite of the community‐bound individual that many legal pluralists have in
mind: individuals are able to choose among different laws not because they feel
bound by all of them (as legal pluralists would argue) but because they feel bound
by none of them. Law, for them, becomes a matter not of culture and tradition but
instead a commodity52.
Smits, knowingly or not, adopts, in his concept of legal pluralism, a powerful critique
of legal pluralism, namely that it does not allow for individual agency.53 Some legal
pluralists have made a similar step: they now emphasize the empowering potential
of legal pluralism, which enables in particular members of minorities to alter,
strategically, between the invocation of different rules for their interest—state rules,
local rules, and global rules (especially human rights rules).54 His ideas are thus

Smits invokes O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 26.
On the inability of economic analysis to account for tragic choices, see M
Nussbaum, ‘The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost‐Benefits Analysis’
(2000) 29 Journal of Legal Studies 1005.
51 In this volume.
52 See supra note 27.
53 Supra note 23.
54 SE Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into
Local Justice (University of Chicago Press, 2006); B Rajagopal, ‘The Role of Law in
49
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comparable to those of Joerges mentioned before: the individual uses pluralism to
escape laws and require them to justify themselves.

b) Mandatory and Facilitative Rules
Somewhat surprisingly, however, Smits does not go all the way, and his ‘radical legal
pluralism’ is, in the end, anything but radical. Smits limits party choice to facilitative
rules. This makes it necessary to distinguish facilitative from mandatory rules, as
Smits points out, but he does not tell us how the distinction should be made or, more
importantly, who should make it. (He does not, unfortunately, make use of the
ample literature in choice of law on the question.)55
This limitation to facilitative rules is in opposition to neoliberal theories of conflict
of laws.56 Here, proponents of a market for laws see its biggest attraction in the
possibility for individuals to opt out of otherwise mandatory rules of one legal
system by choosing another. Taking away that choice robs the approach of much of
its neoliberal appeal. It goes behind even existing law, which allows parties to avoid
most mandatory rules of the normally applicable law by choosing another law, and
only protects so‐called internationally mandatory rules against the party choice.57
However, leaving mandatory rules untouched will also leave legal pluralists
unsatisfied. Facilitative rules are already widely subject to party autonomy under
existing private law; insofar Smits only states the status quo. By contrast, the main
focus of legal pluralists is precisely on situations in which actors face conflicting
rules all of which claim applicability, and this is the difficult case. What about he
Muslim who wants to comply with both religious and state law requirements? What
to make of mandatory rules and the conflicts between them? Smits rightly argues, in
accordance with both private international law scholars58 and legal pluralists59, that
territoriality no longer serves as a good criterion. But he (like them) does not give us

Counter‐hegemonic Globalization and Global Legal Pluralism: Lessons from the
Narmada Valley struggle in India’ (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 345.
55 See R Michaels, ‘Die Struktur der kollisionsrechtlichen Durchsetzung einfach
zwingender Normen’ in R Michaels & D Solomon (eds), Liber amicorum Klaus
Schurig (Sellier 2012) 191.
56 MJ Whincop and ME Keyes, ‘Statutes’ Domains in Private International Law: An
Economic Theory of the Limits of Mandatory Rules’ (1998) 20 Sydney Law Review
435; EA O’Hara, ‘Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual
Choice of Law’ (2000) 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 1551.
57 R Michaels (supra note 55).
58 EG Lorenzen, ‘Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws’ (1923) Yale
Law Journal 736; H Muir Watt, On the Waning Magic of Territoriality in the Conflict
of Laws, in M Andenas and D Fairgrieve (eds),
Tom Bingham and the
Transformation of the Law: A Liber Amicorum (Oxford University Press, 2009) 751.
59 PS Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction’ (2002) 151 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 311.
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any clearer answers60 than his hope for a legal doctrine that will move towards
arguments.61

c) The Marketplace for Rules and Ideas
The hope is that the legal system will evolve, and the better rules, the better ideas
will succeed. Here, Smits takes up his earlier ideas of a ‘free movement of legal
rules,’62 an idea in turn inspired by (again neoliberal) concepts of regulatory
competition, and combines it with a Habermasian hope in the ‘unforced force of the
better argument’.63 This faces two important kinds of criticism.
First, this looks, in the end, more like a monist than a pluralist theory. In the
competition for legal rules, the best one ultimately wins, and we have unity.64 In the
Habermasian discourse, the better argument wins in the end, what we have is a
tendency toward consensus and thus unity.65
Second, the hope that legal evolution will, somehow, lead to victory of the better
argument presumes a rather perfect (‘herrschaftsfrei’) market for those ideas, and
no interventions from special interests. It thus runs up against a criticism, which,
from the opposite side, has been made against theories of legal pluralism, too:
blindness to power relations.66 In legal pluralism, the almost romantic fascination
with intersystemic dialogue and mutual deference sometimes tends to be blind to
the role of power in determining winners and losers. Fascination over the fact that
state law can never fully overcome non‐state law but is instead influenced by it,
makes some legal pluralists blind to two possibilities: First, the state may sometimes
be ‘cunning;’ it may pretend to be weak in order to avoid responsibility for
outcomes.67 Second, whether state law or non‐state law wins, in a given conflict,
Cf the suggestions in R Michaels, Territorial Jurisdiction after Territoriality, in PJ
Slot & M Bulterman (eds), Globalisation and Jurisdiction (Kluwer International
2004) 105.
61 For Smits’ own suggestions on the role of legal argument more general, see now
his impressive book The Mind and Method of the Legal Academic (Elgar 2012).
62 J Smits, ‘A European Private Law as a Mixed Legal System. Towards a Ius
Commune through the Free Movement of Legal Rules’ (1998) 5 Maastricht Journal of
European and Comparative Law 328.
63 E.g. Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures
(MIT Press 1987) 130.
64 Cf. J Smits, ‘Mixed Jurisdictions: Lessons for European Harmonisation?’ (2008)
12.1 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law.
65 C Mouffe, ‘Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism?’ (1999) 66 Social
Research 745.
60
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S Randeria, ‘The State of Globalization: Legal Plurality, Overlapping Sovereignties
and Ambiguous Alliances between Civil Society and the Cunning State in India’
(2007) 24 Theory, Culture and Society 1.
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allows no a priori conclusion for whether the concrete result of that victory is
desirable or not. The same seems true for a marketplace of legal ideas: some ideas
win because they were favored by those powerful or numerous enough to make that
happen, but that does not say much about their intrinsic quality.
In the end, an umpire seems to be needed. Smits indeed finds such an umpire in the
nation state and its lawmaker, who can (and, as he says, should) make clear which of
its rules are mandatory (and thus exempt from party choice) and which are not.68
This preference for statutory determination of mandatory rules is shared in the
literature on private international law.69 But it weakens considerably the pluralist
idea of moving beyond state centralism.

V. A postmodern pluralism – Wilhelmsson
Yet a different concept of legal pluralism emerges from the work of Thomas
Wilhelmsson. 70 Wilhelmsson aligns himself with postmodernism, 71 and it is
therefore no surprise that he finds influence in the ideas about legal pluralism
voiced by Boaventura de Sousa Santos.72 Wilhelmsson’s starting point is one that is
prominent in (though not exclusive to) postmodernism: contemporary societies are
intrinsically, and irreducibly pluralistic. This is the case on the European level and
on the national level. As a consequence, Wilhelmsson’s legal pluralism operates at
two levels: between, and within national legal systems.
As concerns pluralism between national legal systems, Wilhelmsson suggests
(insofar like Legrand) that different legal systems rest on very different cultures and
value systems. If this is so, then a static European unification would not be merely
technical; it would also disrupt grown national and local structures and cultures of
law. Wilhelmsson is here thinking less of the common law (which is Legrand’s main
focus) and more of Nordic law with its purported greater emphasis on informality
and on social values.73 In particular, he points out, the German Civil Code (BGB) does
68

Smits (supra note 76) 335..

O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 26.
In what follows, I can unfortunately only draw on publications in English.
71 E.g. T Wilhelmsson, ‘Towards a (Post)modern European Contract Law’ (2001) 6
Juridica International 23. But cf. T Wilhelmsson, ‘The ethical pluralism of late
modern Europe and codification of European contract law’ in J Smits (ed) The Need
for a European Contract Law—Empirical and Legal Perspectives (Europa Law
Publishing 2005), 125 (preferring late‐modern over postmodern).
72 E.g. T Wilhelmsson, Critical Studies in Private Law ‐ A Treatise on Need‐Rational
Principles in Modern Law (Springer, 1992), 224‐226. Santos prefers to speak of legal
plurality, largely because he opposes elements in the legal pluralism debate. Cf B de
Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense (Butterworths, 2d ed. 2004), 89‐
98.
73 T Wilhelmsson, supra note 72, at 16‐20 et passim; T Wilhelmsson, Social Contract
Law and European Integration (Dartmouth Publishing Company 1995), 7‐11,191‐
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not provide a helpful model for a European codification, because ‘[t]he BGB was
made for a bourgeois society and for a[n] original market capitalism and in that
sense could reflect a fairly homogeneous world outlook.’74 Our world is different;
we face a ‘dissolution of traditional structures of understanding’ and therefore an
ethical fragmentation that can no longer be captured by a coherent code.75
Wilhelmsson’s plea for a ‘fragmentized Europeanization’76 realises that even if
Europe retains a plurality of national legal systems, it is important to focus
somehow on the interrelation between these.
However, unlike Legrand, Wilhelmsson does not treat national legal systems as
relatively coherent and autonomous. Instead, he emphasizes also the internally
pluralistic character of national legal systems. The same dissolution also functions
on the level of the state. The state becomes fragmented internally – different
authorities attain semi‐autonomy and will thus not always apply the same law the
same way. But the state also becomes fragmented externally: ‘the borderline
between state and society becomes less and less clear’ 77 (an aspect that
Wilhelmsson does not, as far as I can see, discuss at great length elswhere.
And, furthermore, Wilhelmsson even welcomes – to some extent – the mutual
irritation between different laws. He shares Smits’ preference for a free transfer of
legal rules and ideas,78 though with less sympathy for an actual market that would
generate such a transfer. What he calls a ‘Jack‐in‐the‐box’ theory of European law is
the idea that European law suddenly pops up within domestic legal systems in
unexpected situations.79 This creates disruptions in the national legal systems, but
such disruptions can in fact be useful to break up old structures and traditions.
208. An interesting ‘outsider’s’ analysis is J Smits, ‘Nordic Law in a European
Context: Some Comparative Observations’ in J Husa et al (eds.), Nordic Law ‐
Between Tradition and Dynamism (Intersentia 2007) 55.
74 T Wilhelmsson, ‘Ethical pluralism’ (supra note 71) 121.
75 See ibid 136; ‘Contextual morality is difficult to connect with a general civil code
with a strong systematic structure;’ cf. T Wilhelmsson, Welfare State Expectations,
Privatisation and Private Law, in T Wilhelmsson and S Hurri (eds) From Dissonance
to Sense: Welfare State Expectations, Privatisation and Private Law (Ashgate, 1999) 3,
18‐22. Andrei Marmor has made a somewhat related argument from a Rawlsian
liberal perspective: our pluralism of ultimate conceptions of the good suggests that
legislative coherence is not of high value: Andrei Marmor, Should we Value
Legislative Integrity?, in Andrei Marmor, Law in the Age of Pluralism (Oxforud
University Press, 2007) 39.
76 T Wilhelmsson, ‘Private Law in the EU: Harmonised or Fragmented
Europeanization?’ (2002) 1 European Review on Private Law 77, 89 ff.
77 T Wilhelmsson (supra note 72) 224.
78 T Wilhelmsson, supra note 74, at 124.
79 T Wilhelmsson, ‘Jack‐in‐the‐box theory of European Community law’, in: L Krämer
et al (eds), Law and Diffuse Interests in the European Legal Order: Liber Amicorum
Norbert Reich (Nomos, 1997), 177; T Wilhelmsson, ‘Private Law in the EU:
Harmonised or Fragmented Europeanization?’ (2002) 1 European Review on Private
Law, 79‐82.
17

In many ways, Wilhelmsson’s concept of legal pluralism is the one closest to strong
or sociological legal pluralism as discussed above – and thus, many problems of his
approach are problems of the whole idea of legal pluralism. In what follows, I want
to focus on three problems with the conception that stem not from this proximity
but from what I perceive as problems with Wilhelmsson’s concept.

a) External Pluralism and Internal Coherence
A first problem is one that we already saw in Legrand’s concept: the problem of
internal homogeneity and essentialism. If pluralism is about plurality of legal
systems, then it implies that differences between such systems are greater than
differences within such systems – and thus, that systems themselves are relatively
coherent internally. This is unproblematic for a communitarian concept; indeed, it
might be considered a founding element of communitarianism. It is, however,
diametrically opposed to the postmodern idea that Wilhelmsson espouses, namely,
that legal systems are internally fragmented, too.80
And yet, when Wilhelmsson espouses a specific Nordic approach to law, he arguably
falls into this trap of homogeneity. 81 The idea that Nordic law has certain
characteristics has become hugely popular in Nordic countries.82 But it presumes
that there is something typically and (relatively) homogenously Nordic about law in
Nordic countries. Moreover, if indeed law and society are as closely interconnected
as Wilhelmsson suggests, then this presumes also that there is something typically
and (relatively) homogenous about Nordic society. And this seems unavoidable. The
stronger our claim that differences exist between the national systems of the EU, the
more necessary it becomes that these legal systems are internally relatively
coherent. The stronger external plurality thus implicates an internal homogeneity.83
Both these claims are problematic not only methodologically, but also factually.
Rasmus Goksor shows in his forthcoming Duke dissertation how much the idea of a
Nordic, or Scandinavian, identity is more a product of the 19th and 20th century than
an essential trait of Scandinavia per se. And he demonstrates in that dissertation (as
he has in an earlier publication)84 that the idea of a specifically ‘social’ character of
Nordic law, as compared to a hard liberal European law, is more complex than is
usually acknowledged. Scandinavian law, like the law of any other country or region,
80
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emerges from numerous internal struggles that remain infinitely unresolved, and
‘social’ ideas struggle with more market liberal ones. Scholars often take
Wilhelmsson, one of the first to write at length in English about Scandinavian law, as
a spokesperson for all of Scandinavia, because they cannot follow the internal
Scandinavian debates. But it seems that the relatively coherent Scandinavian
identity in law and society is used as a strategic argument to fight off certain
influences from Europe (or to propose alternatives for European law). Wilhelmsson
realizes the strategic use of such proclamations of homogeneity when, in talking of
Germany, he refers to ‘the homogeneity of (the dominating perceptions) of
society.’85 Claims for the homogeneity of Nordic society may be similar: dominating
perceptions invoked for strategic reasons, not actual empirical truths.

b) Pluralism and systems of law
This last insight suggests a problem with another of Wilhelmsson’s claims about
legal pluralism. I refer to his claim that pluralistic societies make pluralistic law
necessary and unavoidable – or, the flipside, that systematic and monist law is
possible only for homogenous societies. This is a frequently made argument in
private law debates, but I think it either rests on an error or is at least too
simplistic.86
Consider Wilhelmsson’s claim that the systematic BGB was possible in the 19th
century only because society was largely homogeneous, both in its values and in its
setup. This historical assumption is hardly tenable: German 19th society was deeply
fragmented.87 Political views ranged from far more extreme edges than they do
today. Society was relatively stratified, and if the 19th century was the century of the
bourgeoise, then the pleas of the working class were already growing louder, and
their exclusion from the new BGB was already a ground for its criticism.88 If
Wilhelmsson invokes Wieacker for his claim of societal homogeneity,89 he must
misunderstand Wieacker, who points out explicily, though elsewhere, ‘that the BGB
tried to reconcile several different value‐systems which nineteenth century German
society had allowed to coexist witout coalescing; it is not the mouthpiece of a united
social and political movement.’90
T Wilhelmsson, ‘Ethical pluralism’ (supra note 71) 121..
I am hoping to work these points out in more detail in a separate paper.
87 The classical work is HU Wehler. Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, Vol 3 ‐ Von der
'Deutschen Doppelrevolution' bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges 1849‐1914
(2d ed. 2007); cf. also T Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1800‐1918 (3 Vols., pb. ed.
1998).
88 T Repgen, Die soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts. Eine Grundfrage in Wissenschaft
und Kodifikation am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts (2001).
89 F Wieacker, Industriegesellschaft und Privatrechtsordnung (1974). Wieacker’s
views on the relatively liberal character of the BGB have been criticized by J Rückert,
‘Das Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch ‐ ein Gesetzbuch ohne Chance?’ in Juristenzeitung
(2003), 749.
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In fact, the German history suggests the exact opposite of Wilhelmsson’s claim might
be true: a systematic and technical private law may be especially appropriate for a
pluralistic society.91 The reason is that technical law can translate otherwise
unsolvable substantive disputes into solvable technical ones 92 Substantive
incommensurability of plural values is thus overcome in a legal system that
guarantees internal coherence as an alternative.
This may or may not be true. It is certainly the case, that the more regulatory law of
the 20th century has created a law that is more fragmented, and this may be a sign of
pluralism. The point here is that political and societal pluralism is different from
legal pluralism, and one does not immediately translate into the other.

c) Irritants
A third point, however, may be the most important one. Recall how Legrand and
Smits dealt with the possibility of legal systems influencing each other. Legrand
opposed such influence; Smits celebrated it as a welcome consequence of regulatory
competition and free party choice of law. Wilhelmsson does not want to protect
national law from Europe (as Legrand does), but neither is he willing to leave
interactions between legal systems to a market (as Smits does). Instead, he suggests
a careful calibration:
‘Solutions cannot be picked out here and there, without strict analysis of their social
and cultural background. In a transnationally‐oriented legal research which makes
use of the fragmentation of law it s not a question of an arbitrary flow of transplants
from one place to another, but of finding suitable legal irritants to develop one’s
own legal surroundings’.93

This reference to Teubner’s concept of legal irritants is interesting.94 Unlike
Wilhelmsson, Teubner focuses less on the active choice by the law reformer and
more on the internal reactions of legal systems to irritations. And indeed, from his
systems theoretical perspective, the idea of actively picking proper irritants seems
somewhat paradoxical: If a legal system picks what it wants to be irritated by, then,
because it can already predicts what will happen, that is by definition no longer an
irritation – in the same way in which we cannot tickle ourselves.95
It may be that what Wilhelmsson has in mind is less the reformer in the national
system deciding on what to be irritated by, and more the superior governor – say,
Thus eg E Denninger, ‘Recht und rechtliche Verfahren als Klammer in einer
multikulturellen Gesellschaft’ in RM Kiesow et al (eds), Summa. Dieter Simon zum
70. Geburtstag (Klostermann, 2005), 117.
92 See for this attractive feature of technique K Knop et al (supra note 37) 642 ff.
93 T Wilhelmsson, ‘Private Law in the EU: Harmonised or Fragmented
Europeanization?’ (2002) 1 European Review on Private Law, 94.
94 G Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends
Up in New Divergences’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11.
95 PM Bays et al, ‘Attenuation of Self‐Generated Tactile Sensations Is Predictive, not
Postdictive’ (2006) PLoS Biol 4(2): e28. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0040028.
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the European Commission – deciding how to irritate individual legal systems. In this
context, of course, strict analysis of social and cultural background are necessary
(though frequently ignored).96 But if this is a pluralist perspective, it is at best one of
weak legal pluralism: a pluralism that exists due to the recognition of the whole,
which in this case is not the state but something functionally similar, the European
Union. Ultimately, it appears, Wilhelmsson also shies away from taking the last step
towards adopting a true pluralism with no hierarchically superior institution to
order and structure it.

VI.Concluding Remarks
It turns out that none of the three theories discussed here is an actual theory of legal
pluralism. Legrand’s pluralism is a communitarianism without significant
interactions between the separate legal orders he has in mind. Smits proposes a real
plurality of interacting legal orders, but then leaves untouched what is perhaps the
central issue of legal pluralism, namely mandatory rules,. Wilhelmsson, finally,
comes closest to an actual concept of pluralism, but oscillates between ideas of
fragmentation and homogeneity, and flirts with regulatory ordering of the pluralism.
An actual theory of European private law pluralism is still lacking.
And it may not be forthcoming. After all, all three concepts of legal pluralism are
sharply different, but all have several traits in common, too, that may be
characteristic of the European debate.
A first commonality is that, when using the idea of legal pluralism, all three authors
focus almost exclusively on the idea of a plurality of (formal) legal systems – in
particular, national legal systems –, and ignore the second important aspect of legal
pluralism, namely the idea of privately created law. This is not to say that ideas
about society are absent from the proposals: Legrand conceptualizes laws as
mirrors of society; Smits suggests that choice of law is a way to opt out of culture;
Wilhelmsson suggests that the plurality of society makes plural legal systems
necessary. But in all these concepts, society is a cause for the development of the
legal system, not a creator of law on its own. In the end, what all of them focus on as
their starting point, is formalized law. This is representative of most debates on
European private law more generally.
A second commonality is that none of the three authors here settles for a ‘strong’
legal pluralism. Wilhelmsson and Smits both assume a superior lawmaker:
Wilhelmsson’s lawmaker decides which irritants will work best; Smits’ superior
lawmaker sets up a system of choice of law rules that protect mandatory rules from
free choice. Legrand alone seems to oppose such a superior lawmaker, but he does
appeal to a general ethical position against mutual domination and influence
between legal systems. Here, we see the European preference for ‘ordered

R Michaels, ‘Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business
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pluralism’97 Whether viewed as a problem or an opportunity, ultmately, pluralis is
something that needs to be regulated.
These are shortcomings vis‐à‐vis legal pluralism, but not necessarily shortcomings
for European private law. The relative neglect of non‐state law is not necessarily a
bad thing, at least analytically, perhaps even normatively.98 The legal pluralism
debate has always struggled with the distinction of law and non‐law. That may not
be a problem for sociological and anthropological accounts, but it does become a
problem for debates about law reform.
I have more doubts about the perceived need for an ordered, weak, as opposed to a
strong legal pluralism. But in discussions about law reform, a purely sociological
perspective as is inherent in traditional concepts of strong legal pluralism, may be
inadequate. It may leave reform to technocractic law reformers who may want to
implement German‐style Codes without sensitivity to the issues the three authors
here raise. To engage in law reform debates (as do all three authors), one must
enagage in legal discourse. A sociological legal pluralism may be informative for this,
but not necessarily conducive to proper legal solutions.
Although these theories are not truly pluralist, we learn something about European
private law from each of them. But do we also learn something about legal pluralism,
and its adequacy for European private law? The fact that all existing pluralist
theories of European private law fail, at least as theories, does not mean that legal
pluralism is an intrinsically inappropriate concept for European private law, but it
certainly leaves some doubts. Ultimately, it may be that legal pluralism is less
adequate than other approaches: The idea of relatively autonomous legal orders
does not square well with the interpenetration of European and national law in the
European Union. The concept of interlegality, although occasionally invoked also for
the relation between European and national law,99 may be inferior to recent
attempts to reinvigorate conflict of laws.100 This suggests that, ultimately, legal
pluralism may just have been another terminology with which the ongoing debate
on European private law has been led. That may not be so bad.
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